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Abstract
Anomaly Detection is essential to understand the diﬀerence between normal and anomalous traﬃc.
An anomaly maybe something that disrupts the network or allows an attacker unwanted access to
modify or steal data. An anomaly in a network may occur at various layers. There are applica-
tion speciﬁc anomalies which attack a speciﬁc application or group of applications e.g., MAC layer
anomalies mostly DOS/DDOS attacks and anomaly at transport layer is SYN-Flood Attack. It’s a
very widely studied concept in both traditional and Software-deﬁned Networking (SDN).
The accuracy of anomaly detection is directly dependent on network ﬂow measurement, which
often introduces overhead in the network. This overhead is eﬀected packet sampling rate that is
essential to detect anomalies. Using centralized SDN architecture, the overhead on traﬃc measure-
ment has been reduced to a certain extent. However, it still incurs a signiﬁcant overhead and misses
a special set of anomalies stated as Concurrent Distributed Anomalies (CDA). Hence, domain spe-
ciﬁc distributed SDN controllers have been proposed with additional beneﬁts of being cost eﬀective,
scalable and reliable.
The main goal of this thesis is to deﬁne what can be considered an concurrent distributed anomaly
and how these anomalies are undetectable in centralized SDN architecture. This is achieved by
elaborating concurrent distributed anomalies scenarios and implementing detection technique using
multi-domain SDN architecture. The proposed solution scaled the network into multi-domain SDN
architecture. It comprises of two entities viz., a multi-domain SDN network and a CDA detector.
The network is divided into multiple non-overlapping SDN domains and each domain consists of
a SDN controller and a part of the network infrastructure. Detection of anomaly in one domain
is independent of detecting anomalies in other domains. This reduces the computational load at
centralized point of anomaly detection by distributing the traﬃc ﬂow measurement among domains.
Hence, this helps in detecting anomalies across the domains.
We evaluated the system in the terms of sensitivity, scalability and responsiveness of the system.
The sensitivity, which came out to be 80% deﬁnes our design detects concurrent anomalies correctly.
This enables the system to achieve better responsiveness to detect CDA with lesser delay. The
solution was found to be scalable enough for deploying over large network. Our results shows that
distributed architecture helps in detecting CDA as compared to centralized architecture without
imposing additional overhead.
The proposed work can be used to detect coordinated attacks, which either caused the network
damage or trying to ﬁnd vulnerability in the system for the larger attack later in the future. Thus,
this solution can be used for real-time early detection
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection in networks is stated as the prediction of anomalous traﬃc before it causes faults
in the network. This feature is essential to provide a reliable, quality of service (QoS) and eﬃcient
load balancing scheme. The problem of network anomaly detection is of primary importance in
network security due to various reasons such as network intrusion, denial-of-service attacks, buﬀer
overﬂow attacks etc. Networks are targeted daily by attackers seeking to disrupt or disable them and
the traﬃc they generate are the most common anomalies in the network. When the bandwidth of
the network gets ﬂooded by such anomalies, denial-of-service attacks may happen which eventually
degrades the quality of the network. For large organizations, continuous denial-of-service attacks may
result in the loss of several important functionality and thus lead to a decrease in the performance
of the organization’s services. Thus, it is very important to improve the accuracy of such anomaly
detection mechanisms.
To maintain network availability, the monitoring system must detect and diagnose potential
network problems and initiate appropriate recovery or mitigation actions. In traditional networks,
anomaly detection has been done using proper placement of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [1].
Drawbacks of IDS are: low detection accuracy, unbalanced detection rate for diﬀerent types of
attacks, high false positive and predeﬁned policy based system with high computing power required
for operation [2].
Most of the anomaly detection in traditional networks is done using machine learning techniques
[3] which consist of following two steps:
• In the training phase, the behavior of the network is observed in an idle condition i.e., trusted
network and machine learning techniques are used to train the system for such normal behavior
• In the detection phase, this training is compared against the current behavior of the system,
and any deviations are triggered as potential attacks.
SDN [4] was proposed with a great functionality which changes the way that existing network archi-
tectures works in term of specializing device operation, intelligent packet forwarding and network
deployment to reach an intelligent network. In SDN architecture [4], the actions in data plane are
controlled by a programmable, logically centralized control plane, which can easily interact with
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other network management systems. Anomaly detection on SDN introduces some beneﬁts in terms
of easiness of deploying the monitoring points and ﬂexible ﬂow counting. This assists in acquiring
packet sampling rate of the network in a better way.
Previously, anomaly detection has been done on centralized SDN architecture [5], wherein the
network is programmed and controlled as a single entity. However, the centralized SDN controller
faces the issues of scalability, reliability and single point of failure. Hence, a suggestion to build a
logically centralized, but physically distributed control plane has been proposed [6]. This technique
enjoys the advantages of the distributed architecture meanwhile keeping the simplicity of the cen-
tralized system. In anomaly detection, collecting statistics is one of the core functionalities of the
controller. However, centralized statistic collection in SDN does not scale in some metrics, therefore
the system may not be able to pick out a set of short-lived anomalies which can be Concurrent Dis-
tributed Anomalies (CDAs). CDA includes malicious traﬃc which is generated by a group of nodes
simultaneously at multiple locations in the network. The collective impact of this event aﬀects the
core network and makes it congested. This increases the overhead on centralized anomaly detector
which leads to failure in detecting CDA. The biggest diﬃculty of detecting CDA in centralized archi-
tecture is the latency in detection. As a result there is a delay between the cause and consequences
in the network. Thus, we use distributed architecture to solve this problem without introducing
additional load into the network.
1.2 Main Objective
The main goal of this work is to propose an architecture which detects concurrent distributed
anomalies. This architecture brings the advantage of fast computational at monitoring points that
lower down the overhead on the controller. In this architecture the network is divided into multiple
domains in which each controller detects anomalies generated in its vicinity(domain); which then
helps in the detection of distributed anomalies. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• To solve the problem of detecting concurrent and distributed anomalies in feasible multi-
domain SDN architecture
• Evaluation of system in terms of eﬃciency, scalability and sensitivity with diﬀerent distributed
attacks comprising of numerous hosts
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Chapter 2
Software Deﬁned Networking
2.1 Overview
Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN) is a network paradigm as shown in Figure 2.1 which separates
the control plane from the data plane. This paradigm is diﬀerent from traditional network in the term
of packet processing. In traditional, network nodes have capability to decide how to process incoming
packets. In SDN, those two tasks are decoupled. The switches forwarding the incoming packets
to external entity called controller. This external entity is taking a packet forwarding decision.
SDN provides a programmable network, in which the entire traﬃc can be adjusted dynamically or
controlled by the centralized program.
Open Networking Foundation (ONF) was founded in March 2011 which state SDN architecture is
dynamic, manageable, cost-eﬀective and adaptable. The gole of this organization is the promotion
and adoption of Software Deﬁned Networking through open standards development. Later, ONF
introduces OpenFlow protocol, which deﬁne the communication between switches and controllers
2.2 OpenFlow Protocol
The OpenFlow protocol cab be adopted as standard for SDN. This ensures communication using
control plane and data plane between the controller and OpenFlow-enabled switches. Each switch
maintain an internal ﬂow table, which contains a set of rules called as Flow Rules. These rules is
used by switch to process incoming packets on the data plane. The controller is managed the ﬂow
table, which takes the decision of adding, deleting or modify ﬂows. To make this communication
secure , the controller and the switch are connected via a secure channel, usually TLS/SSL.
The ﬂow table entry consists of the following components
• Header Field – This ﬁeld is matched against the arriving packets
• Actions – This is applied to the matching packets
• Counters – This increments every time if a packet matches
3
Figure 2.1: SDN Architecture (source: ONF homepage)
2.2.1 Message Types
The OpenFlow speciﬁcation deﬁnes three classes of messages:
Asynchronous
• Packet In: If an arriving packet does not match any ﬂow table entry, a PACKET IN message
is sent to the controller
• Flow removed: A ﬂow can be removed for diﬀerent reasons, i.e. a timeout (hard timeout or
idle timeout)
• Port status: The switch should send this messages on port conﬁguration changes
• Error: The switch notiﬁes the controller of errors
Controller-to-Switch
Controller-to-switch messages are initiated by the controller. These message are generally one way
and switch may not give an answer. Six types are deﬁned in the OpenFlow speciﬁcation:
• Features: The controller sends a FEATURE REQUEST message on connection and the switch
answer with a FEATURE REPLY specifying its capabilities
• Conﬁguration: The controller can set and request conﬁguration parameters
• Modify-State: Messages that are used by the controller to create, modify or delete ﬂows
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• Read-State: The controller can request statistics from ﬂow tables, ports or ﬂow table entries
• Send-Packet: the controller may send packets and asked the switch to output them to a speciﬁc
port
• Barrier: Messages are used to request notiﬁcations for completed operations
Symmetric
Generally there are two types of symmetric messages are allowed in OpenFlow. HELLO messages
are exchanged on connection start-up, ECHO REQUEST and ECHO REPLY messages are used to
determine latency or bandwidth.
2.2.2 Switch
Open vSwitch is designed to perform one main task: in a hypervisor environment, it can be used
as a bridge to connect virtual machines with external networks. Normally, this is done by the
Linux bridge. However, Open vSwitch provides extended features. Open vSwitch may also be
used as a mere virtual switch, e.g. for testing network applications. The software Mininet, for
example, provides a local virtualized network on a single PC. Mininet uses Open vSwitch to simulate
OpenFlow-enabled switches. Besides virtual switches, ONF members are producing OpenFlow-
enabled hardware switches.
2.2.3 Controller
In SDN, the control plane is located in a special network component, called the controller. Since it is
purely software-based, available with many development group. In addition to commercial solutions,
many open source controllers are available. They diﬀer mostly in the way the northbound API is
implemented. While the southbound API is standardized to a great extent, the interfaces on top of
the controllers are very diﬀerent. The commonly used controllers are:
• Ryu: Ryu is a component-based software deﬁned networking framework. Ryu provides software
components with well deﬁned API that make it easy for developers to create new network
management and control applications
• Floodlight: The Floodlight Open SDN Controller is an enterprise-class, Apache-licensed, Java-
based OpenFlow Controller. It is supported by a community of developers including a number
of engineers from Big Switch Networks
• POX: Pox as a general SDN controller that supports OpenFlow. It has a high-level SDN API
including a queriable topology graph and support for virtualization
5
Chapter 3
Related Work
Traditionally, anomaly detection was achieved by deploying additional computing devices with IDS
capability in the backbone network. SDN infrastructure introduced faster mitigation by updating
the anomaly detection techniques. This has increased the research in the area of anomaly detection
in SDN infrastructure; to improve the eﬃciency and try to decrease the false alarm. The initial
studies focused on testing the anomaly detection methods which have been successfully deployed in
traditional networks and can now be deployed in SDN by using its advantages. Akbar Mehdi et al.
[5] have done an extensive survey of the existing methods on anomaly detection on legacy networks
and have extended them to SDN infrastructure. In this paper, many anomaly detection algorithms
were used to validate that these methods were suitable for low network traﬃc rates. K. Gliotis et al.
[7] proposed the solution by combining the functionality gained by sFlow [8] and Openﬂow [9] for
anomaly detection and mitigation in SDN environments. Zhang Ying [10] formulate the problem in
a diﬀerent way and suggested a ﬂow counting method with dynamic rule replacement algorithms for
anomaly detection in SDNs. The work done by Himura et al. is a statistics based anomaly detection
algorithm with automatic parameter tuning. Above mentioned researches feature regular network
monitoring to detect anomalies based on ﬂow rules.
However, previous research only considered anomaly detection on centralized SDN infrastructure.
When a centralized system is further expanded to distributed domain, it gives many beneﬁts such
as less overhead, load balancing, scalibility, privacy and ﬂexibility. The work done in DISCO [11],
an extensible DIstributed SDN COntrol plane, manages its own network domain and communicates
with other controllers to provide end-to-end network services. In another research in ElastiCon
[12], an elastic distributed controller architecture contains a pool of controller which is dynamically
grown or shrunk according to traﬃc conditions and the load is dynamically shifted across controllers.
Hence, proposed solution is a ﬁrst attempt to solve a problem of detecting concurrent distributed
anomalies. Since it uses distributed approach in solving these problems, its a novel method in itself.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Work
4.1 Concurrent Distributed Anomalies (CDAs)
4.1.1 What is CDAs
CDAs are anomalies which are generated at logically or physically distributed locations at the same
time or in a predeﬁned amount of time. They can be short-lived which often occur over a large period
of time. CDAs mainly consist of anomalies with ignorable impact which are undetectable. But when
caused at multiple locations simultaneously, they could become problematic to the network. As an
example, CDAs are activities which can be performed to search for vulnerability across the network.
This kind of activity if done at multiple locations simultaneously in very short interval are considered
as CDAs. A group of nodes, referred to as botnet, is remotely controlled by a botmaster and can be
used for malicious activity. The purpose of this group can be to increase the number of bots in the
group by trying to infect more number of users’. These kind of activities are important to detect
in order to save a far worse attack in the network. So, CDAs detection helps in early detection of
attacks.
4.1.2 Diﬃculty in Detecting CDAs
Suppose, a particular anomaly is generated at multiple locations in the network at a certain time.
Some of these anomalies are generated for a nominal amount of time and might get missed by the
detector. On the other hand, some of these anomalies may get detected with a certain delay due
to congestion in the network or overloading the controller. The detection of CDAs are diﬃcult by
using existing centralized SDN architecture. Various diﬃculties in detecting CDAs in centralized
architecture are:
• Latency and sensitivity in detection leading to delay between the cause and observed behavior
in the network. The main reason for latency is increased congestion in control plane due to
short interval statistics in addition to normal traﬃc
• Degree of concurrency of the anomalies is increased beyond some threshold, which might lead
to the system failure to perceive the diﬀerence between anomalies generated by coordination
and other miscellaneous anomalies generated by attacks
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Figure 4.1: Multi Domain SDN Architecture with CDA Detector
• Minimum number of ﬂow rules required to detect CDA. If the amount of ﬂow rules used for
monitoring is reduced, some concurrent anomalies could be missed
Technically, it is better if every ﬂow rule is observed, but it is a very costly method. These issues
can be handled by proper placement of multiple traﬃc capturing points in the form of multiple
isolated domain-speciﬁc SDN controller architecture.
The basic architecture for CDA Detection is shown in Figure 4.1. It comprises of two entities
viz., a multi-domain SDN network and a CDA detector. The network is divided into multiple non-
overlapping SDN domains and each domain consists of a SDN controller and a part of the network
infrastructure.
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All these SDN domains report the detected anomalies in its infrastructure to the CDA detector.
The CDA detector is a logically centralized system which communicates with all the domains in the
network. It collects the information about the detected anomalies from diﬀerent domains within the
network.
4.2 SDN Domain Functionality
The network has multiple domains and each domain has the following stake holders:
4.2.1 Traﬃc Statistic Probe
The traﬃc statistic probe is designed on the simple match-and-count rules, installed and adjusted
by the controller on the switch. The switches can send traﬃc counters to the controller periodically.
If the statistics are collected in a large period, then the detection algorithms may miss frequent
short-lived anomalies. Similarly, if it is done over a short period, it can generate a lot of traﬃc to
the control plane, and overwhelm the controller. Our design provides ﬂexibility to choose probing
intervals to collect data and it can operate on ﬂexible short and long period intervals as compared
to centralized detection systems that work at only ﬁxed intervals.
Detection Method Anomaly Type Traﬃc Feature Parameter Example of heuristics
Signature Based
Anomaly
Type-1
Packet Count, TCP Header Flag
If the ratio of SYN/ACK
ﬂagged packets is more than
20% then it is traﬃc generated by
SYN Flooding
Anomaly
Type-2
Source IP, Destination IP
If the request is an ICMP
packet and Destination IP
as same as the Broadcast IP
then it is traﬃc generated by
Smurf attack
Anomaly
Type-3
Packet Size, Packet Count
If packet size is more than
100bytes and if count ratio
more than 20% of total ﬂow
then it is traﬃc generated by
Ping-of-Death attack
Anomaly
Type-4
Source IP, Destination IP,
Destination Port, Flow Size
and Packet Count
If a particular source IP is
sending a request for a range
of server port address on one
host or multiple host then
it is traﬃc generated by
Port Scanner
Anomaly
Unknown-1
The Parameter is not
classiﬁed into any above
categories
If the host cannot be classiﬁed
into any above categories,
then the event is classiﬁed into
Unknown category
Stastical Based
Anomaly
Type-5
N number of packet in a
window Pi is the probability
of each element in the window
Entropy(H) = −
�
i=1
Pi logPi
Anomaly
Type-6
Tranning data like Bandwidth
Classiﬁcation and Clustering
based approach is used to
detects sudden changed
in the network
Anomaly
Unknown-2
Automatic Parameter Tuning Miscellaneous Anomalies
Table 4.1: Non-exhaustive list of anomalies used by the system based on sample heuristics
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4.2.2 Anomaly Detection
Anomalies in the network are stated as the identiﬁcation of sudden change in the network. This
sudden change has happened because of traﬃc generated by some attacks. So in this research
categorization of attacks has been done on the basis of existing detection techniques: signature
based and statistical based on the underlying approach adopted by each technique:
• Signature Based – Signature based anomaly detection methods are designed to detect anoma-
lies generated by known attacks. These attacks are recognized by the feature it aﬀects in
the network which are identiﬁed as its signatures. Such systems require predeﬁned rules or
knowledge of the anomalous traﬃc. In Table 4.1 the ﬁrst four anomaly types belong to this
category and require parameters like header ﬂag, ﬂow size, packet count, etc. to identify the
signature of the malicious traﬃc whereas the last type is classiﬁed as unknown.
• Statistic Based – Network traﬃc varies with time or space and thus cannot be detected using
rule based approach. So learning techniques have been used to detect these kind of anomalies.
The above discussed categories are a part of a non-exhaustive list of anomalies that our system
can detect. In the Traﬃc Preprocessing functionality, we decide the input parameters to the anomaly
detection module are given in Traﬃc Feature Parameter of Table 4.1.
4.2.3 Anomaly Classiﬁer
This module ﬁrst labels the anomalies based on traﬃc features and then organizes and stores the
data in an eﬃcient data structure.
• Anomaly Tagging – The nodes in the network face a plethora of malicious activities. So, there
is a need to categorize similar activities into groups in the form of tagged Anomaly Type as
shown in the Table 4.1.
• Data Organizer – The main function of the data organizer is to store the data in the best
possible way in order to get faster search and access time. The detected anomaly is stored in
a two-level data structure as shown in Figure 4.2.
The ﬁrst level hashes the input where the key is the anomaly type and the value is a pointer to
the second level of sorted sets. The sorted set consists of Anomaly Type and the TimeStamp at
which the anomaly occurred. Deploying a hashing mechanism allows for ﬂexibility in adding
more number of anomalies without changing the design of the system. Using sorted set helps
in retrieving the most recently detected anomaly.
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Figure 4.2: Data Structure used in Data Organizer
4.2.4 Messenger Client
The messenger client is used to send the most recently detected anomalies with timestamp to a
messenger server running at the CDA detector. Message Passing Protocol with instant messaging
functionality can be used for this purpose to obtain faster response time. The sample message type
are given below
< ControllerID = ”MACAddress” >
< AnomalyType >Type-1< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< AnomalyType >Type-2< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< /ControllerID >
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4.3 CDA Detector Functionality
Logically, the detector is used to combine the information from multiple domains. The role of this
detector is to report concurrent anomalies in the various network domains with the help of the
following logical entities.
4.3.1 Messenger Server
Messenger server accepts packets from the messenger client on the SDN domain using an instanta-
neous message passing protocol and forwards the same to the centralized data storage module.
4.3.2 Centralized Data Storage
The centralized data storage works in a similar fashion to the data organizer in each domain of
the network. In this two-level design, the ﬁrst level hashing maintains the controller record where
the key is a unique controller ID and value is a pointer to second level of hashing as shown in
Figure 4.3. On the second level, system stores Anomaly Type as the key and a pointer to sorted set
as the value. The sorted set consists of Anomaly Type and the TimeStamp at which the anomaly
occurred. Deploying a hashing mechanism allows for ﬂexibility in adding any number of controllers,
viz., domains to the network without changing the design of the system and the network.
Figure 4.3: Centralized Data Storage in CDA Detector
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4.3.3 CDA Probe
This module compares the timestamp of detected anomalies against the current timestamp of the
system with a permissible diﬀerence between the two timestamps, while accounting for system
and network overheads. The timestamp of the detected anomalies can be retrieved by visiting every
sorted set from the last level of hashing present in the Centralized Data Storage as given in Algorithm
1.
4.3.4 CDA Reporter
The reporter informs the network administrator of the detected CDAs after getting the information
from the CDA probe which is done by calling CDA Probe with given Controller ID and polling time
Pt. Concurrent distributed anomalies are detected by taking the intersection of the output of the
CDA probe with the Controller ID of each domain.
4.4 Implementation
Our implemented prototype design comprises of two main components: SDN Domain and CDA
Detector.
SDN Domain topologies have been built by using Mininet [13] to emulate Open VSwitch [14]
with virtual hosts and on the top we have written applications using python based Ryu [15], an
open source OpenFlow controller. The modules involved in these domains are: 1) Traﬃc Statistic
Probe, 2) Traﬃc Preprocessing, 3) Anomaly Detection, 4) Anomaly Classiﬁer and 5) Messenger
Client as shown in Figure 4.1. The Messenger has two instances running on client side and server
side respectively. This messenger uses XMPP to ensure instant communication. The client side
instance which is running on all SDN domains network is encapsulating the data (anomalies with
its type and timestamp at which it occurs) and at server side it decapsulates the data. Messenger is
fast as required since it uses XML format while encapsulation. E.g.: suppose a speciﬁc SDN network
found multiple anomalies with respect to time so the same information is encapsulated as
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< ControllerID = ”MACAddress− 1” >
< AnomalyType >Type-1< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< AnomalyType >Type-2< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< /ControllerID >
< ControllerID = ”MACAddress− 2” >
< AnomalyType >Type-1< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< AnomalyType >Type-2< /AnomalyType >
< TimeStamp >YYYY:DD:MM:HH:MM:SS< /TimeStamp >
< /ControllerID >
in an XML tagged packet. Now if the ﬁrst tag reaches the messenger server it will not have to
wait for the entire packet to be received and processed. Instead it will start processing the packet
with the help of tags. In this way, having an XML based packet is fast and instant. Data organizer
and centralized data storage have been built using Redis server [16].
Algorithm 1: Concurrent Distributed Anomaly Probe
Input: Polling Time Pt, Controller ID Id
Output: List of Distributed Anomalies L
procedure CDA Probe ()
Address to HashTable-II A1 = HashTable-I(Id)
� HashTable-I Controller ID
Address to Sset S1 = HashTable-II(A1)
� HashTable-II Anomaly Type
for each entry in S � Sset(S1) do:
if Pt < CurrentTime-S.TimeStamp then
L Add(S.Anomaly Type)
else
break
end procedure
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the system in two steps. First, checking the cor-
rectness of the system prototype using an emulated SDN based multi-domain testbed i.e., system
validation. Second, reporting the performance of the system with the help of various metrics like
sensitivity, response time, eﬃciency, scalability, etc.
5.1 System Validation
Our experimental testbed is built on top of Mininet, which emulates a network of Open VSwitches
and it consists of two SDN domain speciﬁc controllers that are connected to system integrator.
For validating the correctness of the system we require some malicious activities running on the
system. There are existing open source tools available which generate anomalous traﬃc. But here
we describe speciﬁc SDN based attacks on control plane by running malicious applications on the
controller. These applications control the way in which packets would be forwarded to the hosts in
the network. In normal function, a switch sends a PACKET IN message to the controller because no
ﬂow rule matches for the destination host. But the attacker modiﬁes the ﬂow rules of user’s trying
to use the FTP service by monitoring the request and response of PACKET IN and PACKET OUT
messages generated by the switches. The attack is carried out by ordering the switch to forward
the packet to the controller for every packet with destination port number 20 and not installing the
ﬂow rules on the switch for the same.
The traﬃc generated by this attack can be detected as Anomaly A by the domain-speciﬁc con-
troller. If the same anomaly happens simultaneously on many domains in the network, the system
integrator detects it as planned anomalies thereby validating the system. Since the attacker aims to
congest the network with dubious ﬂow rules, the anomaly detection algorithm identiﬁes the amount
of traﬃc generated by the controller to be diﬀerent from the normal behavior of the controller. This
is detected as anomalous behavior of the system thereby validating it.
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5.2 Performance Evaluation
We consider real traﬃc data taken from the MAWI traﬃc repository [17] for evaluation purposes
and a detection algorithm which is available using Weka [18], a tool with a collection of supervised
and unsupervised machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks. We use NetMate for the ﬂow
statistics for network traﬃc which help in calculating the sensitivity of the data. In some cases
random anomalies have been generated on the prototype architecture which serves as a proof of
concept. Performance of the proposed system has been evaluated based on the following parameters
5.2.1 System Sensitivity
The sensitivity of the system can be deﬁned as the ratio of True Positive (TP) and sum of TP and
False Negative (FN) where TP is deﬁned as the number of planned anomalies detected correctly
within polling time and FN is deﬁned as the number of planned anomalies that went undetected
within polling time. So, on average the sensitivity rate of our system is given as
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
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Figure 5.1: Sensitivity of CDA Detector
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For example, Domain A, Domain B and Domain C detected Anomaly Type-T1 at time t and
reported the same to the system integrator. Now polling has been done on integrator and found
Anomaly Type-T1 at Domains A and B but not on Domain C because of polling time being less than
desired. This leads to system integrator not being able to detect anomalies on all three domains.
This case can be dubbed as false negative case. Now if we increase the polling time, we are able to
detect it at all three domains leading to the true positive case.
As shown in the Figure 5.1, we test our system on random generated data with ﬁve anomalies
at three diﬀerent polling times by keeping 20 controllers. With increasing polling time, the TP and
the sensitivity of the system increase and FN decreases. Finally we achieved almost 80% sensitivity
by keeping a moderate polling time.
5.2.2 Scalability
Scalability in distributed systems is an important point for evaluating the system. Thus, we evaluate
this measure by expanding the number of domains in our system. In our experiment, we have two
variables viz., anomaly types and number of domains.
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Figure 5.2: Scalability with constant anomalies
We perform trials to test the scalability by varying the number of participating domains. The
number of domains range from 5 to 20 and the number of anomalies are kept constant at 5. These
experiments are performed by generating all the ﬁve types of anomalies randomly with equal prob-
ability in each domain. Using this technique we are ensuring that the same type of anomalies are
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generated at multiple domains simultaneously. As shown in the Figure 5.2, the scalability varies
between 60-80% by increasing the number of controllers. The reason behind this is that with less
number of domains, the possibility of generating same type of anomalies is low. So we get limited
scalability. On the other hand, we achieve more accuracy by deploying more number of controllers,
with the amount of anomalies as compared to the number of controllers.
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Figure 5.3: Scalability with constant controller
In another scenario we performed an experiment by keeping the participating domains constant
at 20 and varying the type of anomalies from 5 to 20. We observed that the eﬃciency of the system
reduces with increasing number of anomalies with respect to a constant number of controllers as
shown in in Figure 5.3. Based on the above discussion, we provide a bound on our system scalability
by considering the real-time behavior of the network.
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Figure 5.4: Response Time of anomaly detection in Centralized Architecture and Distributed Ar-
chitecture.
5.2.3 Response Time
The response time of the system is measured by detecting concurrent distributed anomalies on
centralized architecture and distributed architecture. The graph in Fig. 5.4 and 5.5 shows the
response time of a centralized system with respect to a distributed system for anomaly detection in
domain and CDA detection respectively. The result have shown designed architecture detect CDAs
in lesser time.
5.2.4 Performance-Gain
The performance of the distributed system can be deﬁned in terms of gain in performance while
extending from centralized to distributed design. The time elapsed between the beginning and end
of execution on a centralized system is given as Tc. In the same way Td is deﬁned for distributed
system. So, the ratio of time taken to solve a problem on a centralized system to the time required
to solve the same problem on a distributed system is given by
Performance−Gain = Tc
Td
The bar chart shown in Figure 5.4 and 5.5 points out the experimental scenario where ﬁve
anomalies are simultaneously generated on both the architectures. The gain in performance of the
architecture is found by using summation of response times of centralized system and distributed
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Figure 5.5: Response Time of CDA Detection Algorithm in Centralized Architecture and Distributed
Architecture.
system calculated using the above formula. It was found to be 1.16, 1.26 and 1.37 respectively for
given number of trials.
5.2.5 Complexity
The time complexity of CDA detector is O(logn) as it uses the two stage hashing data structure
followed by a sorted set in which ﬁrst level hashing provides variability to the number of domains.
In the same way, the second level hashing provides change in the type of anomalies with respect to
a particular domain.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 System Improvement Heuristics
6.1.1 Interpret Planned Anomalies
In our scenario we deﬁned planned anomalies as those that occur at the same time across all the
domains. We can also deﬁne planned anomalies in a diﬀerent way like each domain may be generating
diﬀerent anomalies at the same time as a result of diﬀerent attacks.
6.1.2 SDN based network traﬃc knowledge
We would be focusing on improving the system by gaining the domain knowledge of various attacks
that are speciﬁcally carried out in the SDN network. This knowledge helps us to understand the
behavior of anomalous traﬃc and makes it easier to select the features for the prediction algorithms.
The goal of feature selection is to ﬁlter the dataset to retain relevant attributes.
Sometimes, network faced unexpected behavior. For example, suppose in an NFV environment
some service suddenly goes down. As a result NFV launches a virtual service on a diﬀerent location
in the network. This leads to a deviation from normal traﬃc pattern in the network and it is
classiﬁed as anomalous traﬃc by the existing detector. Thus, having detailed knowledge of SDN
network increases the eﬃciency and improves the system.
6.1.3 System Usability
This system can be used in detecting concurrent malicious activities generated by the software
simultaneously. Others problem such as blocking malicious hosts, saving bandwidth at core and
concurrent anomalies.
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6.2 Misc Topics in Security of SDN
6.2.1 Bootstrapping Flow Aggregation for Anomaly Detection in SDN
Detecting non-application layer anomalies involves counting ﬂow statistics by intermediate devices.
In large networks this may overload the centralized management system. Thus, most common ap-
proaches use sampling and aggregation of ﬂow rules to reduce the amount of load. But the extent
to which ﬂows must be sampled is a crucial point. Poor aggregation methods are very likely to
miss important anomalies and a large sampling frequency may overload the system. Thus, a ﬁne
balance is required between the overhead and the accuracy of the system so as to minimize aggre-
gation/sampling footprint. Approaches have been suggested that use Software Deﬁned Networking
(SDN) and take advantage of its ﬂexibility to dynamically update the rules of aggregating ﬂows
to reduce the loss of missing anomalies. But most of the existing methods perform aggregation
on a single parameter and thus are biased to high false positive results that impose extra load to
counteract them or possibly higher false negative results that miss out important anomalies in the
system.
Our key motive is to validate a model that improves the accuracy of an anomaly detection system.
Towards this, we bootstrap the ﬂow aggregates from the network based on multiple parameters. For
each of the parameters a linear prediction is applied to calculate the set of aggregates for anomaly
detection. Based on these predictions, an appropriate rule replacement method is used to get the
ﬁnal set of ﬂow aggregates for each parameter. We apply a greedy approach to predict anomalies by
choosing the parameter that replaces highest number of rules that detect anomalies. This stacking
of dynamic rule replacements with the bootstrapped multi-parameter aggregates help in improving
the accuracy of a real-time anomaly detection system dependent on the attributes of the network.
Aforementioned task can be done easily on Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDNs) based on Open-
Flow (OF) protocol exports control programmability of switched substrates. As a result, rich func-
tionality in traﬃc management, load balancing, routing, ﬁrewall conﬁguration etc., that may pertain
to speciﬁc ﬂows they control can be easily developed. Implementing this method on current legacy
networks is not possible since changing conﬁgurations for updating rules requires manual conﬁgura-
tion of routers. Hence, the SDN paradigm is used so that its programmability inside controller makes
it possible to dynamically update rules. It allows us to provide speciﬁcation for multi-parameter
bootstrapping on network ﬂow measurements.
Network anomaly detection is of utmost importance especially when it concerns critical high secu-
rity system architectures which requires constant monitoring. To have a accurate tool to measure
anomaly is hence very important. Hence new approaches and eﬀorts are made to ﬁnd more accurate
results for anomaly detection. Our approach considers multiple parameters for detecting anomaly
so that accuracy will increase signiﬁcantly while introducing a very slight extra load on system.
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6.2.2 Addressing problem of collaboration of hacked switches in SDN
The Software-deﬁned Network (SDN) architecture relies on the assumption that all the SDN switches
in the network obey the commands of the controller. However, if someone compromises an SDN
switch using physical access or harmful patches, it can cause malicious activities in the network and
can even bring the entire network down. Therefore, detection of compromised SDN switches is a
major concern. In this paper, we propose a solution for detecting a compromised switch with the
collaboration of other trusted switches.
This enables a network manager to discover the compromised switch present between the trusted
switches and ﬁnd a possible solution for mitigation. Our implemented prototype validation system
works on the network simulation using only the required features of the OpenFlow 1.0 speciﬁcation
enabled on Mininet and Ryu controller. Its eﬀectiveness can be veriﬁed by varying the number of
switches in the network.
A traditional computer network is a hierarchical one which is suited to client-server computing.
But recent advancements in computing such as virtualization and cloud computing need a robust
network which can sustain dynamically changing traﬃc patterns. This gave to a new network
architecture called Software Deﬁned Networking or SDN. The idea here is to make the network
programmable. As already pointed out, the data plane and control plane are separated and the
control plane is centralized. Which implies that the network admin has full control over the aspects
of the network. So, any new functionality can be added over existing network easily. This can
increase the robustness of system considered as a whole in scenarios like load distribution on various
servers. Thus, SDN takes a major leap in network architecture design.
Despite being a promising architecture for future, there are various concerns about security in
SDN. Some of these either did not exist before or were hard to exploit in traditional architecture.
Consider the Denial of Service attack. Distribution of logic gave an inbuilt defense mechanism to
network against Dos attacks. An individual server on a network could still be brought down but
whole network got prevented from being aﬀected . However, centralization of control has turned
the tables. A powerful DoS attack on SDN controller would handicap the network [?]. Even if the
traﬃc is not directed on the controller, unnecessary traﬃc could slow down the functioning of the
network.
Another major concern is that the switches in SDN are dumb entities which in case of any
unknown packet take information from the controller about the action to be taken, yet they are
important enough that someone who has access to it acquires the ability to break havoc on the
entire network. Not much work has been done in the area of security in SDN. Researchers have
talked about authentication and secure channel but the assumption of one master controller and
slave switches bowing to it has always been relied upon. Owing to which the security in SDN can
get compromised in many situations.
Suppose one has physical access to the switch. In this case, a backdoor can be implanted to the
network using this switch which will lead to undesirable consequences. The cracker can remotely
control the entire activity of the switch which was ideally supposed to be done according to the
rules set out by network admin using the controller. Switch can be accessed in a diﬀerent way also.
Consider the case of virtualised networks. Here, switches run over actual end hosts. These hosts can
belong to a traditional IP network. If these systems are targeted by the bad guys, then the SDN
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switch which is just an application running on it is no longer safe. These may look like traditional
problems but corresponding traditional methods which have been extensively used in past to deal
with them cannot be applied directly to SDN because they assume switches to be intelligent which
is not true in case of SDN.
After getting the control over the switch, though the hacker virtually control of every aspect
of network related to that switch. The unwanted activities can take certain forms[?]. It might be
forwarding the packet to the incorrect port. Say, the controller wanted the packet with a certain
match to be forwarded to port 1 but rather than it, the hacker might drive the packet toward port
2. Or perhaps even worse case might be to duplicate the packet on all of the ports bringing in
unwanted network traﬃc. Also, the content of packet can be changed.
Similar attack models were considered in previous works on this area but they have not been
much eﬀective in handling the cases where multiple compromised switches are there. The situation
gets worse where these cracked switches are in collaboration with each other. The problem in this
is unreliability on the results obtained by the test. So, the initial solutions to compromised switch
detection consider a special scenario by not considering all the cases and thus making a questionable
assumption. In this paper, we consider this exact problem of detection of compromised switches in
case there exists a collaboration among them. We oﬀer a tactful method in which rather than adding
all of the previously unaccounted cases at once, which might turn the problem into an unsolvable
one, we consider a bigger subset of cases at once and thus relatively generalizing the scenario. The
case which would not be taken here is not left ignored forever and a probabilistic mechanism has
been described to account for the same.
We use OpenFlow based SDN. OpenFlow is a standard which allows experimental protocols to
be run on a network. It is the ﬁrst standard communication interface designed between control
and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. It allows direct access to and manipulation of the
forwarding plane of network devices. Ryu controller has been used. Ryu is a component based
software based software deﬁned networking framework. It provides well deﬁned API for developers
to build network management and control applications. It supports many communication protocols
including OpenFlow. The eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the approach was tested for diﬀerent network
graphs. The simulation was carried out on Mininet. We use the word good switch or a healthy switch
for a normal functioning switch and a bad switch for a compromised one. Also, we assume that bad
switches can have some intelligence which they owe to malware or any other way which helped crack
that switch. Using this intelligence, they can carry out intelligent bad activities such as making
their collaboration.
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6.2.3 Detection of Cache Pollution in ICN using SDN
Information Centric Networking (ICN) is categorized as a content-driven architecture. In this
paradigm, each node has a unique DNS style naming convention and hosts contents rather than
having a dedicated server. ICN diﬀers from host-centric architecture in terms of data independence
from location, storage, application and transportation thereby enabling in-network caching and repli-
cation. This brings beneﬁts like better scalability with respect to information demand and improved
eﬃciency. Some of the widely used types of ICN architectures are Named Data Networking (NDN)
[19], Content Centric Networking (CCN) [20], Data Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [21],
Network of Information (NetInf) [22] among the few.
ICN achieves universal caching with the help of following motives: uniform, i.e., applied to
all content delivered by any protocol; democratic, i.e., published by any content providers; and
pervasive, i.e., available to all network nodes [23]. Normally, the new cache decision policies store
the most recent requested content in their storage. Sometimes this data might be an unpopular
content which can degrade its performance if held for a long period of time. This can lead to
compromise in the performance of ICN.
Security is an inbuilt characteristic of ICN architecture. Still they are prone to attacks. Attacks
belong to various categories. Some of these include but are not restricted to packet sniﬃng, cache
pollution, breaching privacy by breaking keys and routing attacks. Classifying the attacks is neces-
sary because every attack requires a separate detection and mitigation mechanism and categorizing
the attacks provides with a way to assess the impact of the same.
Caching attack in ICN can be of the following types: (1) Bogus announcements (2) Random
or unavailable content requests and (3) Cache pollution. In (1), the attacker sends false updates
regarding the content on the network which leads to the router being overwhelmed and not able to
send the latest updated content to the requesting node. With the attack (2), attacker sends request
for unavailable content at a rate greater than the converging rate of the router leading to denial
of service. Finally, attack (3) can be described as polluting the cache with unpopular content. An
unpopular content refers to a content that is not frequently requested. This attack may require prior
knowledge of popularity of the content in the network.
Since most of the existing solutions of caching related attacks are designed for a dedicated cache
server and may not work in ICN because all nodes can enable caching we need a dedicated solution
for caching related attacks. So in this paper we are discussing caching attacks in ICN in which the
attacker replaces the content in the cache server with unpopular content. ICN with SDN brings
the added advantage of SDN as it helps in controlling the network characteristics with the help of
programs.
The motivation of this research is to use SDN control plane to obtain a deciding parameter to
distinguish between popular and unpopular content in ICN. This prevents the problem of cache
poisoning in ICN by using advantage of SDN. Obtaining these parameters in ICN was a challenging
task, thus, by using SDN these metrics can be calculated in an eﬃcient manner. This research can
be contribution by providing following functionalities:
• To provide a new solution for cache decision policy of replacing popular content with random
content and
• To solve the problem of cache poisoning in ICN over SDN.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a Concurrent Distributed Anomaly Detection mechanism. It relies on a CDA detector
which comprises of multi-domain isolated SDN networks. This detector system gathers up the logical
data i.e., without any user traﬃc ﬂow, for detecting anomalies from isolated domain controllers of
SDN. We demonstrated how it can eﬃciently detect the anomalies in isolated environments and
later instantly detects concurrent anomalies in distributed environments. In future we planned to
focus on designing of algorithms with more complex concurrent distributed anomalies deﬁnition.
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